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In The Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
KENNETH L. ROTHEY,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

vs.
STEREO-RAMA, INC., a Utah Corporation,
LADON FARNSWORTH, RICHARD A.
RIDGES, d/b/a R. A. RIDGES COMPANY, STANDARD SUPPLY COM-"'
PANY, a corporation, ADAPTACORDER
Case No.
CORPORATION, CHARLES CRITTENDON, MAIN LAFRENTZ, 0. C. TANNER
12906
JEWELRY COMPANY, COMMERCIAL
SECURITY BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants,

and
GEORGE F. MOORE and KAREN
MOORE, his wife,

Defendants and Appellants.

Brief of Defendants and Appellants .
Appeal from the Decree of the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County,
State of Utah
Before the Honorable Stewart .M. Hanson, Judge

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE
This was an action by Kenneth L. Rothey, Plaintiff, against the Defendants for a Judgment and De-
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cree of F'oreclosure on a Promissory :N" ote. From the
Conclusions of Law and the Judgment of Foreclosure,
the Defendants, George F. Moore and Karen Moore
'
appeal.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The case was tried to the Court. The Court found
that the Promissory Note was in default and entered
Conclusions of Law and a Decree of Foreclosure from
the Conclusions, and the Decree the Appellants appeal. ,
RELIEF SOUGHT
Appellants seek a review o fthe Conclusion of Law
of the lower Court and a finding that the lower Court
did commit an error of law and that the case be remand·
ed to the lower Court with instructions to dismiss.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Appellants accept the Statement of Facts as
set forth in the Findings of Fact of the Court, the perti·
nent features of which begin with number 4 and the
pertinent numbers of which are cited in their entirety as
follows:
On or about April 29, 1969, defendant Stereo-Rama, Inc. the record owner of the
above described property executed a note and
"4.

a
mortgage on said property in the amount of

$HO,OOO.OO to Jenson Enterprises, Inc.

Jen son Eenterprises, Inc. duly recorded said mortgage on .May 23, 1969 in Book
2757, Page 211, in the records of the Salt Lake
County Recorder, and said mortgage was recorded prior to the recording of any claim of
lien on said property by any of the other
named defendants.
5.

That Jenson Enterprises, Inc., delivered a check in the amount of $90,000.00 to
Stereo-Rama, Inc., which check Stereo-Rama
cashed and then deposited the $90,000.00 in
its bank account on or about April 29, 1969.
6.

7. The note and mortgage provided that
defendant Stereo-Rama would pay
$1,200.00 per month beginning June 5, 1969
with each payment to be applied first to interest
and the balance to principal.
the

The note and mortgage provided for
interest at the rate of 10 percent per annum.
8.

9. Twelve monthly pay men ts of
$1,200.00 were made on time up to and including the payment due on May 5, 1970. Another

monthly payment of $1,200.00 was made in
June, 1970. All additional payments totalling
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$1,200.00 was paid by checks dated July 22,
1970 and August 12, 1970 an<l was credited

against the note an<l mortgage.

The only other payments made on
said note and mortgage were lump sum payments of $10,000.00 and $5,000.00 paid on
September 23, 1970 and February 4, 1971 respectively.
10.

No payments whatever have been
made on said note an<l mortgage from February 4, 1971 to the present.
11.

At no time were other sums paid on
said note and mortgage.
12.

No other transaction between Jenson
Enterprises and Stereo-Rama, Inc. were related in any manner to the said note and mortgage.
13.

The action was commenced after
September 5, 1971 when the note and mortgage
were more than 30 <lays in default."
14.

(Appellant accepts that the action was commenced
after September 5, 1971, however, the words "when the
note and mortgage were more than 30 days in default"
is a conclusion of law which is also reported in the Con·
Clusions of Law and is improperly included in the Find·
ings of Fact.)
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The Promissory Note (attached to Plaintiff's Complaint) which Promissory Note recites:
"The undersigned confess judgment in
the event of default, however, the undersigned
reserves a 30-day grace period for the
of all installments before a default may be declared."
payment to begin as of June 5, 1969. The Plaintiff
initiated his legal action on September 7, 1971.
ARGUMENT
The record shows that the wastion was initiated by
the Plaintiff Ly service of Summons on ........................
on the 7th day of September, 1971. Rule 3 (a) Utah
Rules. of Civil Procedure states:
"A civil action is commenced ( 1) by filing
a Complaint with the Court, or (2) by the
service of a Summons ... This action was commenced by the service of a Summons on September 7, 1971."

The Promissory Note bears the legend "payment shall
begin as of June 5, 1969." The first payment of $1,200
would be due then on June 5, 1969. (However, all payments were made on or before the 10th day of each
month by oral agreement with mortgagor.) The :Findings of Fact relate that payments were made "on time
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up to and including the payment due on May 5, 1970.
Another monthly payment of $1,200.00 was made in
June, 1970. An additional payment toaaling $1,200.00
was paid by checks datecl .July 22, rn70 and August 12,
1970 and was credited against the note and mortgage."
Further, the Findings state that "other payments made
on said note and mortgage were lump sum payments of
$10,000.00 and $5,000.00 paid on September 23, 1970 ,
and Febmary 4, rn71 respectively." l\1onthly payments
were made and in addition the payments of $10,000.00
and $5,000.00 were made. The amount of money paid
on the Promissory Note constitutes
payments.
If we calculate 26 payments due beginning June
.5, 1!)69, the 2()th payment would have been the payment
due on July ;j, rn.71. The 27th payment would have
come due on August 5, 1971, and the Note provides for
a grace period bringing the time before which any fore·
closure acfon or bringing the time for the next due pay·
ment to be macle before a default could be declared down
to September 10, 1971. An additional payment of
$HOO.OO to apply on the payment due September 10,
1971 has been made. This additional payment had been
made some months before. The Appellants contend that
at the time the action was commenced there was no de·
fault, and that the action should be dismissed. In sup·
port of the foregoing proposition, the Appellants cite
the fallowing authority.
Vol. 12 Am. Jur. 2d, Bills and Notes, Sec. 1029,
Time to Sue. A plaintiff's right to recover on a bill or
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note depends on his right at the inception of the suit
and the non-existence of a cause of action when the
suit is brought is a fatal defect. Thus, such a suit cannot he instituted before the cause of action upon which
the plaintiff must recover has accrued. \Vhere an action
is premature, it must be dismissed, reserving, however,
to the plaintiff the right to bring it in due time.
Sec. 1030, Accrual of Cause of Action. Under the
rule that a cause of action must exist and be complete
before an action can be commenced, a suit upon a bill
or note cannot be instituted before the cause of action
upon which the plaintiff must recover accrues.
Sec. 1032, Under the Commercial Code. The Commercial Code expressly provides the general rule that
a cause of action against a maker or acceptor accrues
(a) in the case of a time instrument on the day after
maturity; ( b) in the case of a demand instrument upon
its elate, or if no date is dated, on the date of issue.
Sec. 1033, Conditions Precedent to Suit. In order
to maintain an action on a bill or note, it is, of course,
essential that all the conditions precedent to the suit
be performed, unless such excuses are waived. In order
to sue certain parties to an instrument, the liability of
such party must first be fixed in the matter recognized
by law in the absence of some legal excuse for omitting,
or a waiver of such conditions.

Farmers' and .1.llerchant.'I' Bank v. Copple, 378 Pac.
2d 219, July 7, 1962. This action concerned a Promis-
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Note and l\lortgage similar to that which we have
in the case before us. The Court reaffirmed the posi·
tion previously taken in the Kansas Court citing other
Kansas cases, stating as follows:
"It may be conceded that a cause of action
on a negotiable instrument does not accme until the instrument matures and a suit commenced before that is premature as cited here
in parentheses ( Uvlwn v. Shattuck, 151 Kansas
966, 101 Pac. 2d 901) ."

It has also hee11 held the maker of a promissory note
to a bank has the entire clay of maturity to make pay·
ment. On an action thereon just after the close of bank·
ing hours on the day it falls due is prematurely brought.
(National Banh of Salina v. Salina Paper Manufactur·
ing CompanlJ, .58 Kansas 207, 38 Pac. 2d 863).

Colorado Kcnworth Corporation v. Henry Cla;y '
JVhitworth, Colorado Supreme Court, December 5,
HWO, 144 Colo. 541, 351 Pac. 2d 626 Ann., and 97
A.L.R. 2d 990. In the above-cited case, the purchaser
of a truck tractor sought to recover the truck tractor
from Colorado Kenworth for its alleged conversion.
They repossessed the vehicle on an assumed defect. It
appeared that upon default of the purchaser and full
installments of payment and interest due, the Seller had
determined to exercise his privilege under an accelera·
tion clause of the mortgage, but before communication
thereof to the Purchaser, he accepted all of the Pur·
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chaser's checks for arrears in payment. The Court held
that the Seller's privilege to use the acceleration clause
to declare the entire line of purchase price due was
waiYecl by the acceptance of payment of the amount
past due.
This case is annoted in 97 A.L.R. 2d 990 and the
annotation states:
position that the unconditional acceptance of a
past due payment with interest operates as a
waiver of the Purchaser's right to insist that
the prior default in payment accelerated the
due date of the entire debt under an acceleration clause contained in the instrument evidencing the debt."
This appears to be the law in all of the juridictions
cited. This would seem to be the law in the State of
Utah.

Ilomcowner's Loan Corporation v. Washington,
161 Pac. 2d 355, 108 Utah 469. The Court stated under
that a default in the payment of
a
interest or an installment of the principal when due
shall g:ve the obligee an option to declare the whole not
due. The general ru]e is that the tender at payment of
the overdue principal or interest before the option to
declare the whole debt due has been exercised cuts off
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the right to exercise the option, a remedy for a suit
commenced before a cause of action has accrued is the
dismissal of a lawsuit. In the case of Reedsport v. Hubbard, 27 4 Pac. 2<l 248, 202 Oregon 370, the Court
stated:
"A suit commenced before cause of action
has accrued should be dismissed and such defect cannot be cured by filing temperamental
complaint for cause of suit arising thereafter."
Title 70 A-3-122, Accrual of Cause of Action.
( 1)

A cause of action against a maker or acceptor

accrues:
(a)

In the case of a time instrument on

the day after maturity.
( 2)

A cause of action against the obligor of a

demand or time certificate of deposit accrues upon de·
mancl, but demand may not be made until maturity.
SUlHl\IARY
At the time the Plaintiff brought his legal action
· h"m the grace
for foreclosure, the Appellants were wit
. · I $60000
period granted by the contract and an add1bona
·
had been paid toward the payment due. It is respectfully
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submitted that the action was prematurely brought and
should be remanded to the lower Court for dismissal.
Respectfully submitted,
Lorin N. Pace

Attorney for Defendants-Appellants
I certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Brief to Walter P. Faber, Jr., Attorney for Plaintiff,
606 Newhouse_r:;>g, Sal Lake City, Utah, postage
prepaid, this _ •
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